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Abstract
Parimutuel principles are widely used as an alternative to fixed odds gambling
in which a bookmaker acts as a dealer by quoting fixed rates of return on specified
wagers. A parimutuel game is conducted as a call auction in which odds are
allowed to fluctuate during the betting period until the betting period is closed
or the auction ‘called’. The prices or odds of wagers are set based upon the
relative amounts wagered on each risky outcome. In financial microstructure
terms, trading under parimutuel principles is characterised by (1) call auction,
non-continuous trading; (2) riskless funding of claim payouts using the amounts
paid for all of the claims during the auction; (3) special equilibrium pricing
conditions requiring the relative prices of contingent claims equal the relative
aggregate amounts wagered on such claims; (4) endogenous determination of
unique state prices; and (5) higher efficiency. Recently, a number of large invest-
ment banks have adopted a parimutuel mechanism for offering contingent claims
on various economic indices, such as the US Nonfarm payroll report and Eurozone
Harmonised inflation.
Our paper shows how the market microstructure incorporating parimutuel
principles for contingent claims which allows for notional transactions, limit
orders, and bundling of claims across states is constructed. We prove the existence
of a unique price equilibrium for such a market and suggest an algorithm for
computing the equilibrium.
We also suggest that for a broad class of contingent claims, that the parimutuel
microstructure recently deployed offers many advantages over the dominant dealer
and exchange continuous time mechanisms.
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1. Introduction
Parimutuel principles were invented in late nineteenth century France by Pierre Oller
as an alternative to the bookmaker syndicates that dominated French gaming at the
time. The parimutuel mechanism supplanted bookmaker horse racing in the USA
beginning in the 1920s and 1930s facilitated in large part by the invention of the
automatic odds calculator (or ‘totalisator’) by Harry Strauss.1
Recently, a number of large investment banks have adopted a parimutuel mechan-
ism for offering contingent claims on various economic indices, such as the US
Nonfarm payroll report, Eurozone Harmonised inflation, and Fannie Mae mortgage
pool prepayment speeds. The parimutuel mechanism employed is a call auction
lasting about one hour for claims on the underlying index which include a variety
of standard and exotic derivatives, including vanilla call and put options, forwards,
digital options, range binary options, and linked buy/sell options such as risk rever-
sals. A unique feature of the microstructure is that all of the claims offered are priced
in equilibrium based upon an implementation of parimutuel mechanism principles.
Our aim is to formalise these principles and point out some of the inherent advantages
of the mechanism as applied to the recent auctions.
As a market microstructure, the parimutuel mechanism has four distinguishing
features: (1) the parimutuel mechanism is a call auction market rather than a con-
tinuous auction; (2) relative prices of contingent claims are equal to the relative
aggregate cost of such claims; (3) the total amount paid for the contingent claims is
exactly sufficient to pay for the contingent claims having a positive return, that is, the
mechanism is self-funding and risk-neutral in the sense that the total premium paid
for contingent claims is equal to the state contingent payouts for all contingent claims
expiring ‘in-the-money;2 (4) a unique set of endogenously determined prices is dis-
covered; and (5) higher efficiency than other trading mechanisms.
Our approach is to formally provide a foundation for the parimutuel mechanism
and then describe in detail the mechanism recently employed in the capital markets.
Our first step then is showing a foundational connection between parimutuel prin-
ciples and the theory of market games. In Section 2, we show that a parimutuel
contingent claims market is a natural extension of a Shapley-Shubik market game
for contingent claims.3 Thus, we connect the parimutuel mechanism to the well-
developed market games literature and show that a parimutuel mechanism is a viable
mechanism for a contingent claims market with endogenous price formation. In
Section 3, we discuss in detail the parimutuel market microstructure recently
employed to offer contingent claims on the Eurozone inflation index, US economic
statistics such as the nonfarm payroll releases, Fannie Mae mortgage pool prepay-
ment speeds and other indices. We show that the parimutuel microstructure with
notional claims, limit orders, and ‘claim bundling’ across states has a unique price
equilibrium. We also present a theorem which shows that all parimutuel mechanisms
can be expressed as a solution to a general eigenvalue problem. Section 4 discusses the
1Considerable empirical work has been done on the efficiency and information characteristics
of parimutuel wagering. See Haush et al. (1994).
2 In this paper, we ignore transaction costs which can be quite significant in parimutuel
gambling contexts.
3 See Shapley and Shubik (1977).
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efficiency and no-arbitrage characteristics of the parimutuel microstructure as applied
to the capital markets. In particular, we show that the liquidity aggregation features
of the parimutuel microstructure, both across time in a call auction and across
disparate types of contingent claims, can reduce the amount of noise around the
fair price of such claims. Section 5 concludes.
2. Parimutuel Microstructure and Market Games
Parimutuel principles are widely used as an alternative to fixed odds gambling in
which a bookmaker acts as a dealer by quoting fixed rates of return on specified
wagers. A parimutuel game is conducted as a call auction in which odds are allowed
to fluctuate during the betting period until the betting period is closed or the auction
‘called’. The prices or odds of wagers are set based upon the relative amounts wagered
on each risky outcome. In microstructure terms, wagering under parimutuel principles
is characterised by (1) call auction, non-continuous trading; (2) riskless funding of
claim payouts using the amounts paid for all of the claims during the auction; (3)
special equilibrium pricing conditions requiring the relative prices of contingent
claims equal the relative aggregate amounts wagered on such claims; and (4) endogen-
ous determination of unique state prices.
When applied to the theory of contingent claims markets, the self-funding and
relative pricing features of a parimutuel system result from the guaranteed existence of
a positive state price vector, p, which excludes arbitrage over the state space.4 The
vector p contains the prices for each elemental state outcome.
We will show that the existence of the positive state price vector combined with
enforcing the equality of the aggregate payouts for each state are sufficient to
guarantee that contingent claims are both self-funding and that the relative prices of
claims are equal to the relative amounts paid for such claims. Assuming no transac-
tion costs, and for purposes of this discussion, zero interest rates, the absence of
arbitrage requires the following normalisation condition on the state prices:
pTe ¼ 1; p > 0; ð1Þ
where p is a strictly positive S-dimensional vector of state prices (probabilities), e is an
S -dimensional unit vector, and superscript T is the familiar transpose operator.
Multiplying by a vector y, an S -dimensional vector containing the aggregate state
payouts for each state, yields the riskless condition that all payouts are identical across
the states:
ðyTpÞe ¼ y ð2Þ
Since the left-hand side of (2) is a vector containing the aggregate premium invest-
ment, (2) states that the state contingent payout of each state is equal to the aggregate
4We employ the term state space to include the usual formalism, i.e., a set O contains an algebra
of events, F, for which there exists a probability measure P: F? [0, 1] satisfying P(Ø)¼ 0 and
P(O)¼ 1 and for any disjoint events A and B:
PðA [ BÞ ¼ PðAÞ þ PðBÞ:
The triple (O, F, P) is called a probability state space, or ‘state space’. See Duffie (1992),
Appendix A.
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premium investment, i.e., that total amounts paid for all of the contingent claims are
equal to the total contingent payouts. And since there is no arbitrage, the pricing
system is linear, so that clearly:
ps
pk
¼ ysps
ykpk
¼ ðy
TpÞps
ðyTpÞpk s; k ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;S ð3Þ
where ps and ys are the sth elements of the vector p and y, respectively. This condition
states that the relative prices of each fundamental state contingent claim is equal to
the aggregate relative amounts paid for the respective claims.
In addition, parimutuel principles include a market structure for arriving at the
equilibrium prices in which state prices are discovered endogenously via a call auction
process. It is the endogenous nature of the price discovery which provides a funda-
mental connection of parimutuel principles, ‘market games’ to be discussed next, and
the contingent claims and market microstructure research.
The seminal paper of Arrow (1964) demonstrated the equivalence of a competitive
exchange economy for contingent commodities with an economy which has a com-
plete and competitive securities market and a spot market in the commodities. In this
competitive analysis, the securities market has contingent claims prices which are
fixed exogenously. Since prices are fixed, each agent’s demand has a negligible effect
on the price. Subsequent research has shown that this equivalence result depends
crucially on the competitive nature of the securities markets. For example, Peck et al.
(1992) show that if the securities market is modelled using a noncooperative market
game with endogenous price formation, then the Arrow equivalence result no longer
holds. See also Weyers (1999).
The market microstructure literature is largely concerned with endogenous price
formation where each agent’s demand has a potentially significant impact on the
market price. Outside the finance literature, there exists a large body of research
utilising the theory of noncooperative market games to model endogenous price
formation. An influential paper by Shapley and Shubik (1977) introduced a non-
cooperative market game for a market with commodities and fiat money but with no
uncertainty. In the Shapley-Shubik market game (SSMG), each trader consigns his
endowment of each commodity to a trading post dedicated to that commodity.
Trade occurs with each trader bidding some of his fiat money to each trading post.
When the trading period ceases, the equilibrium price of each commodity is the sum
of all the bids in fiat money committed to a trading post divided by the total quantity
of commodity consigned to that post. Each trader receives an amount of goods
resulting from his bid of fiat money equal to his bid divided by the equilibrium
price. Shapley and Shubik (1977) and subsequent papers show that an interior Nash
Equilibrium (NE) always exists and that the NE converges to a competitive
equilibrium as the economy is replicated. See, for example, Powers et al. (1994).
The SSMG framework has been applied to markets with uncertainty by Peck et al.
(1992) and Weyers (1999) as indicated above. Our intent here is to analyse an SSMG
market adapted to contingent claims over a state space, i.e., we are interested in the
securities market microstructure which may be generally applicable to derivatives and
other contingent claims markets. We first show that the SSMG market game with a
credit policy restriction on selling is a parimutuel market microstructure. The credit
policy, which is defined further below, requires that selling be done on a secured or
collateralised basis.
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Proposition 1: A Shapley-Shubik market game for contingent claims within a probability
state space with secured selling is a parimutuel market.
Proof: The following notation is required:
J agents indexed j¼ 1, 2,. . ., J;
S states indexed s¼ 1, 2,. . ., S;
wj(o), initial wealth of agent j;
wjsðf Þ, final wealth of agent j in state s;
bjs, agent j’s bid in dollars for state contingent claim s;
xjs, agent j’s offer in dollars for insuring contingent claim s; and
ps, price for state s.
First we define the Shapley-Shubik market game model. In the SSMG model, each
trader makes bids and offers to each trading post, where each trading post corresponds
to a contingent claim within a probability state space. As in the classical SSMG, prices
are equal to the ratio of total money bids divided by total commodity consignments or
offers for each trading post. For a contingent claims market using the above notation,
endogenous price formation therefore takes the following well-known functional form
ps 
PJ
j¼1
bjs
PJ
j¼1
xjs
: ð4Þ
Each state contingent claim price is therefore the sum total of bids in units of money
(e.g., dollars) divided by offers in units of money. The offers can be interpreted as
sales of the contingent claim, or offers to payout 1 unit of state contingent insurance
should the state corresponding to the trading post be realised.
Based upon the preceding notation, the budget constraint for agent j is therefore
wjsðf Þ ¼ wjðoÞ 
XS
s¼1
bjs þ
XS
s¼1
xjsps þ
bjs
ps
 xjs; 8s ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;S: ð5Þ
We assume interest rates are zero and there is no production. Thus, the initial and
final wealth in the economy are equal
XJ
j¼1
wjsðf Þ¼
XJ
j¼1
wjðoÞ!
XJ
j¼1
XS
s¼1
bjsþ
XJ
j¼1
XS
s¼1
xjspsþ
XJ
j¼1
bjs
ps

XJ
j¼1
xjs¼0; 8j¼1;2; :::;J ð6Þ
as implied from the definition of price ps,XJ
j¼1
bjs
ps

XJ
j¼1
xjs ¼ 0; 8s ¼ 1; 2; : : : ; S: ð7Þ
We refer to this condition as the market clearing condition. Summing over s yields the
initial (i.e., at the time of premium settlement) market clearing condition that total
premiums paid equal total premiums sold, or:
XJ
j¼1
XS
s¼1
bjs 
XJ
j¼1
XS
s¼1
xjsps ¼ 0: ð8Þ
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Since all the states comprise a state space, it is required that:
XS
s¼1
ps ¼
XS
s¼1
PJ
j¼1
bjs
PJ
j¼1
xjs
¼ 1: ð9Þ
Clearly, nothing so far developed prevents sellers of claims (i.e., sellers of ‘insurance’)
from defaulting. To address the possibility of default, we assume that the market
imposes the following credit restriction on offers of notional insurance.
Define a credit policy as follows: Total offers of notional insurance for any state
must be secured by at least the total premiums sold for all of the states, i.e.,
XJ
j¼1
xjs 
XJ
j¼1
XS
s¼1
xjsps; 8s: ð10Þ
Substituting from the market clearing condition, yields:
XJ
j¼1
bjs
ps

XJ
j¼1
XS
s¼1
bjs; 8s ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;S ð11Þ
which yields
PJ
j¼1
bjs
PJ
j¼1
PS
s¼1
bjs
 ps; 8s ¼ 1; . . . ;S: ð12Þ
Since the states comprise a probability state space,
XS
s¼1
ps ¼ 1: ð13Þ
Thus, it must be the case that
PJ
j¼1
bjs
PJ
j¼1
PS
s¼1
bjs
¼ ps; 8s ¼ 1; . . . ;S; ð14Þ
which states that the price of each state is equal to the total bids for that state divided
by the total bids for all of the states. Thus, the equilibrium pricing condition for the
Shapley-Shubik market game for contingent claims requires the relative prices of
contingent claims to equal the relative aggregate bids for the respective claims.
Since the SSMG is also a call auction market which is self-funding with endogenous
price determination, the SSMG for contingent claims is parimutuel.
We can also interpret Proposition 1 in the following way. Each trader who makes an
offer for a contingent claim (i.e., a sale of notional insurance) is required to post margin.
The margin amount is equal to the premium proceeds. This is a standard practice at most
options exchanges and is known as premium margin. Proposition 1 requires that the total
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amount of notional insurance on offer for any state cannot exceed the total premium
margin deposited. Atmost options exchanges, an additional amount of margin related to
the risk of the option sold is also required (oftentimes known as additional margin as is
the case at Eurex Clearing A.G., the clearinghouse for the Eurex exchange). As no
additional margin is required by Proposition 1, we interpret the credit policy to be not
overly tight, especially as compared to existing margin mechanisms in use.
Proposition 2: The credit policy constraint requiring the total notional offers of insur-
ance for any state not exceed the total premiums sold can always be satisfied, i.e., it is
never binding.
Proof: It can easily be shown that any notional sale can be replicated through a purchase
of complementary states within the state space over which claims are traded so that
XJ
j¼1
xjs 
XJ
j¼1
XS
s¼1
xjsps ¼
XJ
j¼1
XS
s¼1
bjs; 8s: ð15Þ
Consider a notional sale where
xjs > 0 and x
j
k ¼ 0 for s 6¼ k: ð16Þ
In this case, agent j sells a claim on state s and on no other state. We use the term
replicated sale to denote the strategy of bidding on the complementary states to state s
in the following way:5
bjs ¼ 0 and xjk ¼ pkxjk for s 6¼ k: ð17Þ
The bid on the sth state of the replicated sale is 0, whereas bids on all other states are
non-zero. To ensure the replication is available, we allow the trading post for each
state- contingent claim to open with an arbitrarily small bid and offer, i.e.,
"sðbÞ ! 0; "sðxÞ ! 0; 8 s ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;S; ð18Þ
where the arguments b and x indicate the small amounts of existing bids and offers
allocated to each state, where these amounts are vanishingly small.6 In equilibrium,
the profits of a replicated sale are identical to those of the original notional sale,
wjsðf Þ ¼ wjðoÞ 
X
s 6¼k
psx
j
s ¼ wjsðoÞ  xjsð1 psÞ;
wjs6¼kðf Þ ¼ wjðoÞ 
X
s6¼k
psx
j
s þ xjs ¼ wjðoÞ þ xjsps ð19Þ
i.e., the final wealth from the replicated sale is identical to the original notional sale
for each state. Any notional sale can therefore be replicated into a complementary bid
which satisfies the credit policy, and therefore replicated sales are payout-achievable.
We have yet to show that an equilibrium exists with such replication going on
during the auction. We turn to this next, and show that any arbitrary number of
replications has a fixed-point equilibrium.
5We note that bidding on all of the states proportional to the price achieves the ‘autarky’
strategy of effecting no change in each agent’s endowments. See Peck et al., (1992).
6 These small liquidity amounts take the place of the usual SSMG convention that the quantity
0/0 owing to zero bids and offers is equal to 0.
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Proposition 3: A unique parimutuel equilibrium exists with replicated sales which are
used to satisfy the credit policy.
Proof: Consider a notional sale where
xjs > 0 and x
j
k ¼ 0 for s 6¼ k:
As indicated above, the replicated sale strategy is
bjs ¼ 0 and xjk ¼ pkxjk for s 6¼ k
such that the strategy bid for s 6¼ k is as follows:
bjs ¼
PJ
j
bjs
PJ
j
PS
s
bjs
xjs ¼ gðbjsÞ: ð20Þ
By the Banach Fixed Point Theorem, there exists a fixed point strategy bid for the
differentiable function g if there exists a constant z< 1 such that
jg0ðbjsÞj  z: ð21Þ
Differentiation of g bjs
 
yields:
g0ðbjsÞ ¼
PJ
j
PS
s
bjs 
PJ
j
bjs
ðPJ
j
PS
s
bjsÞ2
xjs: ð22Þ
From the market clearing condition, above,
xjs 
XJ
j¼1
xjs 
XJ
j
XS
s
bjs: ð23Þ
Together with the obvious
PJ
j
PS
s
bjs 
PJ
j
bjs
PJ
j
PS
s
bjs
< 1 ð24Þ
completes the proof. Uniqueness follows from the contraction property of the
mapping that leads to the fixed point.
Proposition 4: The SSMG and a parimutuel market have equivalent payouts and
first-order optimality conditions.
Proof: Omitted. Available from the authors upon request, as well as in Lange and
Economides (2003).7
7Omitted proofs are rather lengthy but are readily available from the authors as well as in Lange
and Economides (2001), Appendix.
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The first order conditions for the SSMG equilibrium can readily be shown to be:
qjsu
0ðwjsðf ÞÞ
qjku
0ðwjkðf ÞÞ
¼ ps
pk
1þ bjs
Bjs
1þ b
j
k
B
j
k
8><
>:
9>=
>; ð25Þ
which shows that the ratio of expected marginal utilities is equal to the ratio of state
contingent prices, i.e., the competitive Arrow-Debreu economy result, multiplied by
the term in brackets. These are the same oligopoly conditions derived in Shapley-
Shubik (1977). The oligopoly conditions depend on the ratio of the size of trader i’s
bid in each state to the total amount of bids in that state excluding trader i’s bid. They
therefore measure the market’s ability to absorb trader i’s bid strategy. As trader i’s
bid strategy becomes smaller relative to the total bids on each state, the market
approaches the competitively optimal market
3. Parimutuel Microstructure for Contingent Claims
In this section we describe the parimutuel microstructure recently used to auction off
claims on US economic data releases such as nonfarm payrolls, retail sales, and
production indices as well as the Eurozone Harmonised inflation index (ex tobacco
prices) and Fannie Mae mortgage pool prepayment speeds. Our goal is to show that
the parimutuel market has been designed in a manner which yields contingent claims
familiar to market participants in existing derivatives markets. For example, one
feature of the parimutuel market microstructure is that all trading strategies are
implemented with bids and offers of notional amounts of risky claims. In the
Shapley-Shubik contingent claims market game of Section 2, agents implement
strategies with offers of notional insurance xjs and bids of premium dollars, b
j
s.
Conventionally, however, derivatives contracts are based upon the notional amount
to be bought or sold and not denominated in premium dollars. The purchaser of an
option, say on the dollar-yen foreign exchange rate, will specify a desired size of the
position in notional terms, e.g., 10 million dollars, rather than in terms of the amount
of desired premium outlay.
We show next that the parimutuel microstructure allows trading strategies to be
implemented with limit orders, whereby a trader may specify a reservation price above
(below) which the specified purchase (sale) of a given contingent claim will not be
executed. Limit prices have heretofore not been used in parimutuel games.
3.1 Development of the parimutuel microstructure: definitions and setup
In this section, we develop the concepts and mathematical notation needed to
adequately describe the parimutuel contingent claims microstructure recently used
in the capital markets in which trader strategies can be implemented with (1) a
notional buy or sell order; (2) a vector of payout ratios corresponding to a range of
states (claim bundling); and (3) a limit price.
To begin, we let U denote the value of an underlying variable selected for a
parimutuel auction – for example, this variable may be the value of an upcoming
release of an economic statistic such as Eurozone Harmonised Inflation index. Before
the start of the auction, the strikes for the options to be traded on the underlying are
determined. The option strikes are set across the range of likely outcomes of the
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underlying to maximise interest in the claims being offered. Let k1, k2, . . . , kS1 denote
the option strikes and let
k1 < k2 < . . . < kS1 ð26Þ
assuming, for simplicity, that the underlying U cannot take on any values between any
two strikes. These S 1 strikes divide U into S states as shown in the first two
columns of Table 1. Associated with each of these S states are S state contingent
claims that pay out if and only if that particular state occurs.
Prior to the opening of the parimutuel call auction, the financial intermediary
hosting the auction enters orders for each of the S state contingent claims. We refer
to these orders as the opening orders. Let the opening order premium be denoted as ys
for s¼ 1, 2, . . . , S such that
ys > 0 s ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;S ð27Þ
Though opening orders can be small relative to the customer orders, opening orders
ensure that the parimutuel equilibrium prices are unique.
In the parimutuel market recently run on Eurozone inflation, customers submitted
option orders to buy or sell options following standard option market protocols. For
notation, assume that customers submit a total of J orders in the auction, indexed by
j¼ 1, 2, . . . , J. When submitting an order, the customer requests a specific number of
contracts, denoted by rj. For digital options, we adopt the convention that one
contract pays out $1 if the digital option expires in-the-money. For vanilla options,
we adopt the convention that one contract pays out $1 per point that the option is
in-the-money. The parimutuel mechanism is novel with respect to existing parimutuel
wagering schemes in that customers can specify a limit price for each order, as is done
at exchanges including the New York Stock Exchange and the Chicago Board of
Trade, i.e., the limit price for a purchase of an option represents the maximum price
the customer is willing to pay for the option specified. The limit price for a sell of an
option represents the minimum price at which the customer is willing to sell the
option. We use wj to denote the limit price for customer order j.
The parimutuel mechanism replicates each option using the auction’s state con-
tingent claims. For notation, let aj,s represent the notional payout amount of state
contingent claim s used to replicate customer order j. Recall, for instance, from Table 1
that the first state contingent claim is the digital put struck at k1. Therefore, aj,1 is
Table 1
The states, outcomes, and state contingent claims in a PDCA auction.
State Outcome State contingent claim
1 U< k1 Digital put struck at k1
2 U¼ k1 Digital range with strikes of k1 and k2
. . . . . . . . .
s 1 U¼ ks2 Digital range with strikes of ks2 and ks1
S U¼ ks1 Digital range with strikes of ks1 and ks
sþ 1 U¼ ks Digital range with strikes of ks and ksþ 1
. . . . . . . . .
S 1 U¼ kS2 Digital range with strikes of kS1 and kS2
S U kS1 Digital call struck at kS1
34 Jeffrey Lange and Nicholas Economides
# Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2005
U
N
C
O
R
R
E
C
TE
D
P
R
O
O
F
the notional amount of the digital put struck at k1 used to replicate order j. We require
aj,s to be non-negative, and we refer to the vector [aj,1, aj,2, . . . , aj, S] as order j’s
replication weights.
The mechanism determines the replication weights to match order j’s payouts. For
example, a digital call pays out a fixed amount if, upon expiration, U is greater than
or equal to its strike, denoted as kv. If order j is a buy order for this option, then the
replicating weights are
aj;s ¼ 0 s ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; v1 s ¼ vþ 1; vþ 2; . . . ;S

ð28Þ
This set of state contingent claims pays out if U is greater than or equal to kv,
matching the payouts of the digital call. If order j is a buy of a vanilla call spread
with strikes kv and kw with kv< kw, then the replicating weights are
8
aj;s ¼
0 s ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; vþ 1
ks1  kv s ¼ vþ 2; vþ 3; . . . ;w
kw  kv s ¼ wþ 1;wþ 2; . . . ;S
8<
: ð29Þ
For a sell of digital call option struck at kv, the customer profits if U is less than kv at
expiration. In this case,
aj;s ¼ 1 s ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; v0 s ¼ vþ 1; vþ 2; . . . ;S

ð30Þ
The mechanism replicates other options, such as digital puts and vanilla put spreads
in a similar fashion.
Let ps denote the equilibrium price of the sth state contingent claim for s¼ 1, 2, . . . , S.
such that the price of each state contingent claim is positive and that the prices of
the state contingent claims sum to unity. Mathematically,
ps > 0 s ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;S ð31Þ
XS
s¼1
ps ¼ 1: ð32Þ
Note that ps has a simple interpretation as the implied probability that state s occurs
and the sth state contingent claim expires in-the-money.
Let j denote the equilibrium price for the option requested in order j. For simplicity of
exposition, we assume here that the auction sponsor does not charge fees. Then
j 
XS
s¼1
aj;sps: ð33Þ
8 If the underlying U can take on values between adjacent strikes, then the replicating weights
for a vanilla call spread become
aj;s ¼
0 s ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; v
E½Ujks1  U < ks  kv s ¼ vþ 1; vþ 2; . . . ;w
kw  kv s ¼ wþ 1;wþ 2; . . . ;S
8<
:
In this case, the replicating weights are based on the conditional expected value of the
underlying.
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Each option is priced as the sum of the product of the option’s replicating weights and
the prices of the state contingent claims. Based on equations (28) and (29), prices can
be shown to be arbitrage-free in the sense that it is impossible to combine the options
in such a way so as to guarantee a riskless profit.9
Let xj denote the equilibrium number of filled contracts for order j. If the
customer’s limit price wj is below the parimutuel equilibrium price j, then the
order’s bid is below the market, and the order receives no fill, so xj¼ 0. If the
order’s limit price wj is exactly equal to the parimutuel equilibrium price j, then
the order’s bid is at the market, and the order may receive a fill, so 0 xj rj (recall
that rj denotes order j’s requested number of contracts). If the order’s limit price wj is
above the parimutuel equilibrium price j, then the order’s bid is above the market,
and the order is fully filled, so xj¼ rj. Mathematically, the logic for a buy order is as
follows
wj < j ! xj ¼ 0;
wj ¼ j ! 0  xj  rj;
wj > j ! xj ¼ rj: ð34Þ
The logic for a sell order proceeds in a similar manner. As a final piece of notation, let
M denote the total premium paid in the auction, which is the sum of the filled order
premiums paid plus the sum of the opening orders.
M 
XJ
j¼1
xjj
 !
þ
XS
s¼1
ys: ð35Þ
Note that aj,sxj is the payout order j receives if state s occurs and define ys as
ys 
XJ
j¼1
aj;sxj: ð36Þ
Here, ys is the aggregated customer payouts based on the sth state contingent claim.
In matrix form, we can write:
y  ATx: ð37Þ
3.2 Parimutuel Equilibrium Pricing Conditions
We now proceed to develop the mathematical formulation of the parimutuel equilib-
rium pricing conditions. After developing the necessary notation, we first prove that
existence of a unique parimutuel equilibrium where all orders are market orders, i.e.,
the limit order constraints are non-binding. We then provide a general parimutuel
representation theorem which shows that all parimutuel equilibria in our microstruc-
ture are solutions to an eigenvalue problem. In the following section, we then relax the
restriction on limit orders and prove the existence of a unique equilibrium for
arbitrary limit orders.
9 See, for example, theorem 2 of Ingersoll (1987, p. 55).
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One of the core equilibrium conditions of the parimutuel mechanism is that the
system contains sufficient premium to exactly fund any state contingent liability,
which can be written as follows
ys þ ys
ps
¼M s ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;S ð38Þ
Here, ys is the total amount of customer payouts filled for state s and the quantity ys/
ps is the notional payout amount of the opening order for state s. Thus, the left hand
side of equation (35) represents the total payout that the auction mechanism must
make if state s occurs. The right hand side is the total premium collected by the
mechanism. Thus, in a parimutuel system, the amount of premium collected is exactly
equal to the amount needed to settle the total of filled requests for every state. In this
sense, the orders in parimutuel equilibrium are self-hedging.
In another sense, equation (35) relates ys, the aggregate order payouts if state s occurs,
and ps, the price of the sth state contingent claim. For M and ys fixed, the greater the
payouts ys, then the higher ps and the higher the prices of options that pay out if state s
occurs. Similarly, the lower the payouts ys, then the lower ps and the lower the prices of
options that pay out if state s occurs. Thus, in parimutuel pricing equilibrium, the aggregate
demand for a particular state is closely related to the price for that state’s contingent claim.
Finally, letms denote the total filled premium associated with state contingent claim s. Then
ms ¼ psys þ ys; s ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; S
and equation (35) implies trivially that:
ms
mk
¼ ps
pk
s; k ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;S ð39Þ
which states that the relative premium demand for two states is equal to the relative
state prices for those states. We are now in a position to state the following proposition:
Proposition 5: Given demands for orders which are expressed in the form of market
orders, there exists a unique parimutuel equilibrium.
Proof: The proof is based upon a simple application of a contracting fixed point
theorem by summing up equation (35) over all S. The full proof is omitted, but is
available from the authors upon request, as well as in Lange and Economides (2003).
We are now in a position to formulate the following theorem regarding the
parimutuel market microstructure:
Parimutuel Representation Theorem: All parimutuel equilibria are solutions to the
following eigenvalue problem:
Hp ¼Mp: ð40Þ
Proof: Define the matrix H, which has S rows and S columns where S is, again, the
number of defined contingent states in the parimutuel auction, as follows
H 
y1 þ y1 y1 y1    y1
y2 y2 þ y2 y2    y2
..
. ..
. ..
.    ...
yS yS yS    yS þ yS
2
666664
3
777775: ð41Þ
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H is a square matrix with each diagonal entry of H is equal to yjþ ys. The off-diagonal
entries for row s are equal to ys for s¼ 1, 2,. . ., S. Recall that p is the vector of length S
whose s-th element is ps. Note that
Hp ¼
y1p1 þ y1p1 þ y1p2 þ y1p3 þ . . .þ y1pS
y2p1 þ y2p2 þ y2p2 þ y2p3 þ . . .þ y2pS
y3p1 þ y3p2 þ y3p3 þ y3p3 þ . . .þ y3pS
. . .
ySp1 þ ySp2 þ ySp3 þ . . .þ ySpS þ ySpS
2
66664
3
77775 ¼
y1p1 þ y1
PS
j¼1
pj
 !
y2p2 þ y2
PS
j¼1
pj
 !
y3p3 þ y3
PS
j¼1
pj
 !
. . .
ympm þ ym
PS
j¼1
pj
 !
2
6666666666666664
3
7777777777777775
: ð42Þ
Since the ps’s sum to unity (equation 29) we can write
Hp ¼
y1p1 þ y1
y2p2 þ y2
y3p3 þ y3
. . .
ympm þ ym
2
66664
3
77775: ð43Þ
Rewriting equation 35, we have
psys þ ys ¼Mps: ð44Þ
The left hand side of this expression is simply the s-th row of Hp. Thus we can write
Hp ¼Mp; ð45Þ
which is the matrix equivalent to equation 41.10
The intuition for the eigenvalue representation is that a parimutuel pricing vector
must lie in the null space of the net risk, since in a parimutuel mechanism all claim
payouts are funded by premiums paid. The net risk of the parimutuel mechanism is:
HMI: ð46Þ
Thus, a pricing vector which lies in the null space of the net risk means that there
exists a solution to
ðHMIÞp ¼ 0; ð47Þ
which is the eigenvalue result. The eigensystem representation makes it easy to see
that the parimutuel system has a unique fixed point equilibrium.
3.3 Parimutuel limit order book equilibrium
We now introduce limit orders into the parimutuel equilibrium calculations. Limit
orders are an important feature of the parimutuel microstructure under discussion.
10Michael Overton of the Courant Institute of New York University first suggested to us that
our parimutuel problem might have an interesting eigensystem representation.
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Traditional parimutuel wagering methods do not allow for either notional trading,
limit orders, or bundling across risky states. These deficits render the raw
parimutuel structure used for wagering less than optimal for use in the capital
markets. As previously mentioned, options, futures, and other derivatives
contracts are based upon notional contract size, rather than the amount to be
invested in such contracts. Furthermore, parimutuel wagering markets expose
participants to an excessive amount of transaction risk, as all wagers are executed
at prices which vary throughout the auction period and are not known until all
wagers have been made. In the capital markets, it is customary to use the device
of limit prices to limit transaction risk by which participants can assure themselves
that their orders are executed only if the market price is more favourable than
their indicated limit price. Finally, parimutuel wagering is normally conducted in
an ad hoc manner in which liquidity which could be aggregated within the same
state space is fragmented into different ‘pools’. For example, wagers on bets for a
horse to win are held in a parimutuel pool which is separate from wagers on a
horse to ‘place’. This means that not only can there be arbitrage opportunities
across the separate pools, the pricing within each pool is less efficient due to the
disaggregation of liquidity. A viable parimutuel microstructure for the capital
markets should aggregate all liquidity within a state space, effectively allowing
for the no-arbitrage bundling of any type of contingent claim from the funda-
mental state claims.
In the previous section, we have shown how a unique parimutuel equilibrium exists
where limit prices are not binding, i.e., all orders are market orders. In this section, we
prove the existence of a unique parimutuel price equilibrium for limit orders with limit
prices that can take any arbitrary value.
3.3.1 Limit order book equilibrium. We regard limit orders as particularly important
within the context of the parimutuel mechanism for two reasons. First, they allow
mitigation of execution risk owing to changing contingent claim prices during the
auction period. In parimutuel wagering, an early bettor subjects himself to the risk
that the final odds are lower than when the bet was placed. In our microstructure, we
allow traders to control the execution price, effectively substituting a probability of
execution at the limit price or better for the continuous change in odds faced by a
parimutuel bettor. Second, limit orders are a familiar order execution mechanism in
the capital markets which we believe should be incorporated into any viable and
practicable microstructure for contingent claims.
With the introduction of limit orders comes the requirement of specifying an
objective function for determining, subject to the satisfaction of the limit price con-
straints, which orders are executed in equilibrium. We choose to maximise the total
volume of notional orders that can be executed subject to the limit price constraints.
We do this for two reasons. First, we take as our definition of ‘liquidity’ the maximum
amount of notional value that can be accommodated in the auction subject to limit
price constraints. Thus, the choice of objective function reflects the definition of
liquidity which we are trying to maximise. Second, it is anticipated that the sponsor
of the auction will earn transaction fee income as a percentage of notional for each
order. Our choice of objective function therefore reflects choosing the set of orders
that generate maximum fee income. The optimisation problem can therefore be
written in the following form:
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maximize M
subject to
0 < ps s ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;SXS
s¼1
ps ¼ 1
j 
XS
s¼1
aj;sps j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; J
wj < j ! xj ¼ 0
wj ¼ j ! 0  xj  rj
wj > j ! xj ¼ rj
9>=
>>;j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; J
ys 
XJ
j¼1
aj;sxj s ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;S
M 
XJ
j¼1
xjj
 !
þ
XS
s¼1
ys
ys þ ys
ps
¼M s ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;S ð48Þ
Based upon this representation of the parimutuel equilibrium with limit orders, the
following proposition can be stated.
Proposition 6: The parimutuel limit order book problem has a unique price equilibrium
in state prices when there are non-zero opening orders on each state.
Proof: The proof is based upon fixed point continuation methods and is available
from the authors upon request, as well as in Lange and Economides (2003).
In practice, the sponsor of the auction can guarantee that there are non-
zero opening orders on each state. Proposition 6 establishes the uniqueness of state
prices but does not guarantee the uniqueness of the executed order amounts in
equilibrium. The uniqueness of state prices is based upon fixed point methods
which are independent of the maximand (in equation 45, the maximand is M,
the total premium executed in equilibrium). There are S–1 possible degrees of freedom
in the executed order amounts in equilibrium, meaning that the maximum number of
orders which are partially executed is equal to one less the number of states. As in
most microstructure mechanisms, the allocation of partially filled orders is not unique
under equilibrium prices but is instead typically determined by ‘priority rules’, such as
time priority or pro rata allocation. In the maximisation of equation 45, the priority
rule used for the partially filled orders is to allocate them so as to maximise the total
price-weighted volume which is equal to the option premium subject to the unique
and already determined equilibrium state prices. Since the maximisation for the
partially filled orders is undertaken with respect to fixed equilibrium state prices,
the optimisation problem is a linear program. There may be more than one solution
for the partially filled orders under this linear program.
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3.3.2 An Example of Limit Order Book Equilibrium. We provide a simple example of
the solution of the parimutuel limit order book problem. In our example, we use the
following input data:
S¼ 5 states
J¼ 8 orders
y ¼
1
1
1
1
1
2
66664
3
77775; e ¼
1
1
1
1
1
2
66664
3
77775; r ¼
100
200
300
400
200
350
100
150
2
66666666664
3
77777777775
; w ¼
0:4
0:8
0:7
0:9
0:9
0:9
0:25
0:75
2
66666666664
3
77777777775
; A ¼
1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 0
0 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 0
2
66666666664
3
77777777775
The solution to the optimisation problem is:11
x ¼
100:000
109:560
0:000
0:000
8:571
99:011
100:000
0:000
2
66666666666664
3
77777777777775
; y ¼
208:571
207:582
107:582
217:142
208:571
2
6666664
3
7777775
; M ¼ 218:571
p ¼
0:100003859
0:091003287
0:009009933
0:699979066
0:100003856
2
66664
3
77775:
The interpretation of this example is as follows. There are 5 contingent states
representing the fundamental Arrow-Debreu securities. There are 8 submitted orders,
as represented in the matrix A, each row of which contains a 1 if the order spans the
state represented in the first column, and zero otherwise. For example, the first row of
A indicates a digital put option which would pay 1 unit per quantity requested should
either of the first two states occur. The quantity requested, or order size, is represented
in the vector r. For example, the first row of r is equal to 100, indicating that the order
size for the digital put spanning the first two states is 100. The limit prices are
contained in the vector w. For example, the first row of w indicated a limit price of
0.4 for the first order, a digital put spanning the first two states of quantity equal to
100. The limit price indicates that the purchaser of this digital put would like to have
his order executed, in equilibrium, at a price of 0.4 per unit of claim (40 in total) or
lower. A search procedure is used to find the equilibrium based upon the optimisation
in equation (45). The results of solving the equilibrium include the equilibrium
11Details on the computer algorithm used to solve this example are available from the authors.
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amounts that can be executed for each order (contained in the vector x*), the total
amount of executed fill for each state (the vector y*), the total amount of premium
paid for the executed claims in equilibrium based upon their equilibrium prices (the
scalar M*), and the equilibrium prices of the fundamental states (the vector p*). The
search procedure needs to run to a high level of tolerance which is why p is reported to
a high level of precision.
The equilibrium results can be understood by examining the first three orders. The
first order for a digital put spanning the first two states for quantity equal to 100 and
a limit price of 0.4 is fully filled, as can be seen from the first row of x*. It is fully filled
in equilibrium since the price of a digital put spanning the first two states is the sum of
the first two rows of the equilibrium state prices, as shown in p*, which is equal to
approximately 0.191. Since 0.191 is less than the limit price of 0.4 for this order, the
order must be fully filled in equilibrium which is the case. The second order spans the
last two states, as seen from the second row of A, and therefore should be interpreted
as a digital call covering the last two states. From the second rows or r and w
respectively, the order is one to purchase 200 units at a price of 0.8 or lower. As
can be seen from the equilibrium results in the second row of x*, the order is partially
filled at 109.56 out of the requested 200. The price of the order is equal to the sum of
the last two state prices in p* or 0.8. Since the order’s equilibrium price is equal to its
limit price it may receive a fill anywhere between 0 and the 200, the requested amount.
Finally, order three is a digital range spanning the third and fourth states, for 300
units, at a limit price of 0.7. As can be seen by adding the third and fourth rows of p*,
the equilibrium price of this claim is equal to approximately 0.709. Since this is higher
than the indicated limit price of 0.7, the order’s executed amount in equilibrium is
zero, as indicated by the third row of x*.
4. Parimutuel microstructure: arbitrage and efficiency considerations
We believe the parimutuel microstructure proposed and analysed in Section 2 compares
favourably to other microstructures that may be used for contingent claims trading. We
think the parimutuel microstructure under discussion may be superior to dealer-based
and currently used exchange structures for a wide variety of risks. We believe that the
parimutuel microstructure described in this paper is especially superior for those
risks which do not have tradable underlying securities or instruments. We organise
our discussion of the benefits of our microstructure into the following six areas:
(1) risk-neutrality; (2) the absence of arbitrage; (3) efficiency; (4) price uniqueness;
(5) multilateral order matching and; (6) information production.
4.1 Risk neutrality12
Parimutuel principles entail a self-funded auction of contingent claims: all premium
collected, excluding transaction costs, is exactly sufficient to pay for all state con-
12 By ‘risk-neutrality’ we mean that the parimutuel auction is self-funding in the sense that
premium inputs equal state contingent outputs. We do not mean to suggest a connection to the
continuous time options literature which is focused on risk-neutral pricing.
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tingent payouts. From a dealer perspective, the parimutuel microstructure will be
preferable to standard OTC transactions for certain types of derivatives risks. For
example, a dealer in fixed income derivatives will likely find the proposed parimutuel
microstructure favourable for transacting options on the monthly announcement of
the level of the Eurozone Harmonised inflation index since there is no underlying
security or hedgeable instrument.
The proposed parimutuel microstructure effects an arbitrage-free and riskless set of
contingent claims prices and order executions. Effectively, the mechanism achieves
what a dealer would need to do manually through hedging activity in an underlying
instrument (where available) and through balancing risk by adjusting prices with
trading counterparties to equilibrate net notional transactions across states. We
think this simplicity and efficacy of the parimutuel microstructure as adapted to
the capital markets is therefore a potentially useful complement to the traditional
OTC dealer market structure, especially for types of risks which have no tradable
underlying.
We also think that the proposed parimutuel microstructure is superior to conven-
tional exchange-based continuous double auctions for some types of illiquid risks. For
example, for a number of years the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) has offered
options on insurance catastrophe losses as measured by indices published by the
Property Claims Service (PCS). The microstructure used to transact these claims is
a conventional continuous double auction, i.e., the same mechanism that is used to
trade the highly liquid bond futures and options at the CBOT. While there are
perhaps reasons why the PCS contracts have failed to attract liquidity which are
unrelated to market microstructure, see, e.g., Cummins and Mahul (2000), we believe
that the conventional microstructure may be a significant impediment to liquidity, as
we discuss further below.
4.2 Arbitrage-free claims
A parimutuel system is arbitrage-free in the sense that there exists a positive state price
vector which excludes arbitrage. Following the standard definitions (see Ingersoll,
1987, p. 57), we can define the returns table, Z, of a parimutuel state space as follows:
Z ¼ AdiagðpÞ1 ð49Þ
Now, it is well known that if there exists a state pricing vector p supporting the returns
table such that:
Zp ¼ 1 ð50Þ
then there exists no arbitrage possibilities in the sense that there exists no investment Z
across the states which solves either:13
eTh  0
ZTh  0 ðone strictlyÞ ð51Þ
13 See Ingersoll (1987), pp. 54–57 for the elementary proof.
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or
eTh < 0
ZTh  0:
In the proposed parimutuel market microstructure, a definition is that all contingent
claim prices are linear combinations of the state prices, i.e.,
 ¼ Ap:
Multiplication of this definition by diag(p)1 establishes that there is a supporting
state price vector and that no arbitrage is possible by construction of the parimutuel
microstructure.
The claim bundling feature of our parimutuel microstructure by definition rules out
arbitrage in the above-defined sense. A market for state contingent claims, even a call
auction like the parimutuel mechanism under discussion, need not enforce the no-arbitrage
condition explicitly. Namely, we can readily envision a contingent claimsmarket for a state
space which can be modelled without such explicit restrictions as follows:
x ¼ argmax
x
Xn
i¼1
xi
subject to
wj < j ! xj ¼ 0
wj ¼ j ! 0  xj  rj
wj > j ! xj ¼ rj
9>=
>>; j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; J; ð52Þ
which are limit order conditions without the parimutuel and no-arbitrage price
restrictions. In such a market, presumably arbitrageurs would devote capital to
ensuring that arbitrage would be excluded from the prices. The parimutuel mechanism
enforces the normalisation of state prices and the absence of such arbitrage endogen-
ously within the microstructure.
4.3 Efficiency of parimutuel price discovery
The enforcement of the no arbitrage conditions leads naturally to the following
welfare result on the efficiency of the parimutuel microstructure compared to a
model in which contingent claims are traded separately in a call auction over a state
space (the ‘trading post’ model). Essentially, the parimutuel market as implemented in
this paper leads to more efficient (less noisy) prices because the mechanism utilises
information on bids and excess demands in all individual markets (trading posts). Put
it differently, the parimutuel mechanism as implemented discovers prices that reflect
information from all ‘trading posts’ markets, and this makes the prices reflect more
efficiently trading conditions in all posts.
Proposition 7: A parimutuel microstructure discovers prices for contingent claims such that
the average order’s standard deviation around fair value is less than a microstructure with
separate call auction trading posts for each claim. The average order noise savings is equal to
 ¼ 
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p  1ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
 !
M ﬃ ð0:29ÞM ð53Þ
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where
¼ savings due to parimutuel microstructure
M¼ total premium in system
¼ average volatility of price error around the true price (‘noise volatility’)
¼ bid/offer spread assumed proportional to average noise volatility
Proof: Omitted. Available from the authors upon request, as well as in Lange and
Economides (2003).
We also note that the parimutuel mechanism has an additional efficiency gain over
the traditional continuous market because of the time aggregation of orders provided
by the call auction itself.14
There is suggestive empirical evidence supporting the preceding efficiency result.
Gabriel and Marsden (1990, 1991) examine British betting on horses in which pari-
mutuel and bookmakers make prices simultaneously. The bookmakers offer odds on
wagers using the ‘starting price’ odds convention, whereby a bookmaker takes a bet at
odds formed by a consensus of bookmakers just before the race is run. Thus, both the
parimutuel and starting price odds reflect odds just before the race is run. On the same
sample of races, Gabriel and Marsden (1991, Table 1), find that parimutuel returns on
the same races are about 28.7% higher, almost exactly the amount of efficiency owing
to the parimutuel system predicted in Proposition 7.
4.4 Price uniqueness
The parimutuel microstructure possesses a unique price equilibrium for a given set of
opening orders and other orders for contingent claims. Not all microstructures of this
class need possess unique equilibrium prices. Consider, in this regard, the following
modified microstructure similar to the parimutuel discussed in Section 2 above:
x ¼ argmax
x
XJ
j¼1
xj
subject to
0 < ps < 1 for s ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;SXS
s¼1
ps ¼ 1
ðyTpÞe ¼ y
wj < j?xj ¼ 0
wj ¼ j?0  xj  rj
wj > j?xj ¼ rj
9>=
>; j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; J:
ð54Þ
This microstructure problem is otherwise identical with that of equation 45 except
that the parimutuel constraint has been replaced with a weaker constraint in equation
51. The constraint in equation 51 merely requires that the state contingent payouts for
each state be equal. This microstructure has some parimutuel features in the sense that
14 See Economides and Schwartz (1995).
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elemental state claims are normalised, exhibit no arbitrage, and relative prices are
equal to relative premium investments for each pair of states. Yet, there exists no
unique set of state prices which satisfy equation 51. To see this, we consider a state
space with three states. Assume that there are 3 orders: a limit buy order for 300
notional covering state 1 at limit price of .3, a limit buy order for 200 notional
covering state 2 at limit price of .4, and a limit buy order for 100 notional covering
state 3 at limit price of .5. Clearly, any state probabilities satisfying
p1  :3
p2  :4
p3  :5
p1 þ p2 þ p3 ¼ 1
p1y1 þ p2y2 þ p3y3 ¼ y1 ¼ y2 ¼ y3
is a solution to equation 51, and there are obviously many such solutions, which will
satisfy the risk neutrality constraint that all state payouts are equal. For example, one
such solution is
p1 ¼ :25
p2 ¼ :25
p3 ¼ :5
p1 þ p2 þ p3 ¼ 1
p1y1 þ p2y2 þ p3y3 ¼ y1 ¼ y2 ¼ y3 ¼ 100
By contrast, the parimutuel microstructure we propose, embodied as the solution to
equation 45, possesses a unique set of state prices. In the simple example, under
consideration, we assume that there exists opening orders on each state of one unit
so that
y1 ¼ y2 ¼ y3 ¼ 1:
The unique solution is:
p1 ¼ :3
p2 ¼ :4
p3 ¼ :3
p1 þ p2 þ p3 ¼ 1
y1 ¼ y3 ¼ 100; y2 ¼ 100:8333X3
s¼1
psys þ ks ¼ 103:333:
4.5 Multilateral order-matching
The parimutuel microstructure we propose is fundamentally a multilateral order-
matching mechanism, by which we mean there exists no requirement of a discrete
order match between a single buyer and a single seller. Rather, the order-matching
mechanism is inherently ‘many-to-one’ in the sense that any given contingent claim’s
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payout is funded multilaterally by all of the other orders which are filled in equilib-
rium. We regard this feature as particularly important for claims for which there is no
tradable underlying and for which there is not a natural demand for a continuous time
market. For example, we regard our market microstructure to be of potential use to
trade contingent claims on weather, economic statistic releases, corporate earnings
releases, and mortgage prepayment speeds.
The character of our parimutuel microstructure is influenced greatly by the com-
mitment of opening orders, jyj. For jyj ¼ 0, the microstructure resembles a multilateral
matching mechanism in which state prices are normalised, but are not necessarily
unique. For jyj?1, all orders which have limit prices better than the prices reflected
in the opening orders will execute, and will have no impact on the state prices. Thus,
large jyj will tend to resemble a dealer microstructure in the sense that the dealer may
bear significant risk that the distribution reflected in the opening orders distribution
will depart from the ‘true’ distribution. We believe the parimutuel microstructure we
propose will tend to be most attractive at small values of y. We define small such that
1;000 <
PJ
j¼1
jxj
PS
s¼1
ks
< 10;000;
i.e., that the ratio of total premium filled in equilibrium to the total amount of
opening orders is greater than 1,000 and less than 10,000.
4.6 Information production
Our parimutuel microstructure discovers state prices through a state space partition of
an underlying probability distribution. It therefore discovers the probability density
function implied by actual trading activity in a transparent and natural way. Some
experimental data show that standard parimutuel mechanisms have the ability to
aggregate private information (see Plott et al., 1997) into the market density function.
We think the implied density produced in our microstructure will be an important and
high quality informational externality to the market. The quality of the implied
density will be high since the density itself is being traded ‘piece by piece’ in our
microstructure. The density discovered on our microstructure is always enforced to be
a probability state space by design. Continuous time options markets, by contrast,
produce asynchronous option prices at strikes which have varying liquidity and price
noise. As a consequence, the traditional techniques used to extract implied density
functions from continuous options data tend to produce very poor information due to
data limitations and large noise in continuous time options prices (see Breeden and
Litzenberger, 1978).
5. Conclusion
A parimutuel market microstructure for contingent claims recently used by Goldman
Sachs and Deutsche Bank to offer derivatives on Eurozone Harmonised inflation and
other economic indices has been discussed and analysed in this paper. A parimutuel
microstructure is a call auction market with special equilibrium pricing conditions on
the relative prices of contingent claims. We have shown that the parimutuel contin-
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gent claims mechanism recently employed in the capital markets is quite general, and
has its roots in the market games literature.
We have shown how the market microstructure incorporating parimutuel principles
for contingent claims which allows for notional transactions, limit orders, and bund-
ling of claims across states is constructed. We have proven the existence of a unique
price equilibrium for such a market and suggest an algorithm for computing the
equilibrium.
We believe that, for a broad class of contingent claims, the parimutuel microstruc-
ture recently deployed offers many advantages over the dominant dealer and
exchange continuous-time mechanisms. First, the parimutuel mechanism does not
require a discrete order match between two counterparties. Instead, orders are exe-
cuted multilaterally. All executed orders premium is used to fund all of the contingent
in-the-money options, i.e., the payouts. Second, we believe the transparent and
straightforward pricing mechanism will be attractive to market participants. We
believe that the success of the parimutuel mechanism in the wagering markets can,
with the modifications which we have made to the mechanism, be carried over into the
capital markets. Third, we believe that the risk neutral and self-hedging nature of the
parimutuel mechanism, from the perspective of the broker/dealer or other entity
which hosts the auction, offers a superior tradeoff between the risk of derivatives
dealing and the compensation for providing liquidity for contingent claims. We
believe that the parimutuel microstructure may in fact avoid altogether some of
risks inherent in derivatives market-making that periodically result in well-publicised
disastrous outcomes. Fourth, we have shown that the parimutuel mechanism as
implemented in this paper is more efficient than other trading mechanisms. Finally,
we believe that the parimutuel microstructure is ideally suited for completing some
markets where there currently is an absence of liquidity, such as contingent claims on
mortgage prepayment speeds, corporate earnings, weather, and economic statistics,
such as the recent Eurozone inflation auction.
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